We estimate a panel error correction model for loan loss provisions, using unique supervisory data on flow of funds into and out of the allowance for loan losses of 25 Dutch banks in the post-2008 crisis period. We find that these banks aim for an allowance of 49% of impaired loans. In the short run, however, the adjustment of the allowance is only 29% of the change in impaired loans. The deviation from the target is made up by (a) larger additions to allowances in subsequent quarters and (b) smaller reversals of allowances when loan losses do not materialize. After one quarter, the adjustment toward the target level is 34%, and after four quarters is 81%. For individual banks, there are substantial differences in timing of provisioning for bad loan losses. We present two model-based metrics that inform supervisors on the extent to which banks' short-term provisioning behaviour is out of sync with their target levels.
Introduction
The recent global financial crisis was accompanied by a strong decline in bank profitability (e.g., BIS (2009a)). Although banks provision for bad loan losses at all times, the allowances for bad loan losses were not designed to absorb all loan losses since the crisis began. Banks had to increase the level of their allowances as a consequence of the accumulation of problem loans, which came at the expense of bank profits, thus making provisioning procyclical (e.g., BIS (2009b) ).
Obtaining timely information on banks' bad loan losses is essential to bank supervisors. Slowing banks' reporting of loan loss provisioning could delay regulatory interventions by several quarters, as it results in a rosier picture of the banks' solvency than is justified. The potential information asymmetries between banks and their supervisors require bank supervisors to have clear insight into banks' timing of loan loss provisions.
In this paper, we show how panel error correction models may provide insight into the timing of loan loss provisions. Using supervisory micro data on the allowance for loan losses of 25 Dutch banks over the period 2008Q2-2014Q2, we apply this model to answer three questions: (1) Do banks immediately make provisions when impaired loans arise? (2) What are banks' target levels for the allowance for loan losses? (3) And at what speed are allowances adjusted to this target level? In particular, we show how supervisors may process the model output into two metrics that reveal the extent to which banks' short-term provisioning behaviour is out of sync with their target levels.
Specifically, for our sample, we find that banks aim for an allowance of 49% of impaired loans. In the short run, however, the adjustment of the allowance amounts to only 29% of the change of impaired loans. The resulting deviation from the target level is mostly made up by (a) provisioning more in subsequent quarters and (b) reversing lower amounts when loan losses do not materialize. After one quarter, the adjustment toward the target level is 34%, and after four quarters is 81%. For individual banks, the model outcomes are used to compile two metrics that reveal the extent to which banks' short-term provisioning behaviour is out of sync with their target levels. These reveal considerable differences in the timing of provisioning for bad loan losses between banks.
Previous empirical literature on banks' loan loss provisioning mainly focuses on three different issues. One strand of literature addresses the cyclicality of loan loss provisioning. Many studies have shown that loan loss provisioning is mostly backward-looking and procyclical (e.g., Laeven and Majnoni (2003) , Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) , Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) , Foos et al. (2010) , Bolt et al. (2012) , Pool et al. (2015) ). 1 The incurred loss model, as implemented under International Accounting Standards (IAS) 39, generally does not allow provisioning for bad loan losses before a "loss event" -such as a 90-day overdue payment -has occurred. This model has been viewed as recognizing impairment losses "too little and too late" and promoting cyclicality. To avoid procyclicality, this literature often recommends the introduction of a forward-looking loan loss provisioning practice rather than a backward-looking one (e.g., Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012) ). After the global financial crisis, and following the suggestion of the Financial Stability Board, the G-20 and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision initiated a project to replace the incurred loss model with the expected loss model. This has resulted in the changeover from the incurred loss model under IAS 39 toward the expected loss model under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 9, scheduled to become effective in 2018 (e.g., Gaston and Song (2014) ). Under IFRS 9, banks will have to provision not only for credit losses that have already occurred but also for losses that are expected in the future. Users of financial statements have noted that significant opportunity remains for banks to improve disclosure before the transition to these new standards; see Financial Stability Board (FSB) 2015.
The second strand of literature deals with the empirical modelling of loan loss provisioning behaviour as such. Beatty and Liao (2014, especially Section 5) summarize and investigate nine such provisioning models.
2 In all these models, the dependent variable is the net change of the allowance for loan losses (called "loan loss provision"), scaled by total loans. However, the explanatory variables differ. Beatty and Liao (2014) find that one of the main factors behind the differences in performance between these nine models is the inclusion or exclusion of lagged loan loss allowances (scaled by total loans) among the explanatory variables. Beatty and Liao (2014) explain: "The rationale of controlling for past allowance is that if banks recognize sufficiently high provision in the past, then the current provision may be lower." (p. 366). This rationale hints at a short-term adjustment of the allowances in view of some target or equilibrium level that is considered to be "sufficiently high". This type of adjustment behaviour may be, but is not in any of these studies, captured by an error correction modelling specification. An error correction model incorporates a long-run relation, e.g., between provisions and impaired loans, and allows for short-term deviations from that relation that are closed or "corrected" over time according to a particular adjustment speed. In this study,
we will estimate such a model for the provisioning behaviour of banks.
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The third strand of literature addresses the hypothesis that loan loss provisioning is discretionary, to fulfil managerial objectives such as tax evasion, income smoothing, and/or capital management (e.g., Beaver and Engel (1996) , Ahmed et al. (1999) , Shrieves and Dahl (2003) , Fonseca and González (2008) , Huizinga and Laeven (2012), Cohen et. al. (2014) , Norden and Stoian (2014) ). Our empirical evidence suggests that banks adjust the level of the allowance gradually to their target levels. We will show theoretically that this gradual adjustment behaviour does not result in a structurally lower or higher average level of the allowance.
However, the gradual adjustment behaviour will result in a delayed and smaller increase of the allowance for loan losses when there is a strong increase of the amount of impaired loans. This may result in provisioning too little, too late, especially in crisis times. Our empirical evidence also shows that the adjustment speed differs between individual banks.
Our research results are relevant for bank supervisors for two reasons. First, if bank supervisors are sufficiently aware of the gradual adjustment in loan loss provisioning as described by our empirical model, this may help to assess the severity of the situation if the amount of impaired loans starts to rise sharply during a crisis, such as the recent one in 2008. Second, if bank supervisors are sufficiently aware of the differences between banks in the timing of provisioning, this may add to their judgment of which banks face the most acute problems in their loan portfolios. In other words, for supervisors, it is relevant to know which banks are slower when adjusting their allowances for loan losses to their target levels.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold: First, we estimate a panel error correction model using supervisory micro data on the allowance for loan losses of 25 Dutch banks over the period 2008Q2-2014Q2.
The estimation results yield insights into the timing of loan loss provisioning of the sample of banks during the recent crisis. Second, we examine which flow of funds into and out of the allowance for loan losses contributes most to the adjustment of the level of the allowance to the target level. For this, we use supervisory data that are unique in the sense that they comprise detailed flow of funds into and out of the allowances for loans losses at a quarterly frequency. Moreover, instead of observing the flow of funds on the total of all impairments, our data provides the impairments specifically for loans and receivables. Third, we use the model outcomes to reveal differences in provisioning behaviour among the individual banks in our sample. For this, we define two metrics that are based on model output and may be useful for supervisors as a tool to assess provisioning behaviour of individual banks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3 presents the model and sets out the estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the results for the whole sample. Section 5 discusses the theoretical implications from a supervisory point of view. Section 6 shows how estimation 5 results may be used to monitor the provisioning behaviour of individual banks. Robustness checks with alternative model specifications are presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
Data
We use supervisory data on the levels of, as well as the flow of funds into and out of, loan loss allowances of Dutch banks. Instead of observing the general level of impairments and allowances, we use data specifically on the banks' loans and receivables. The data have a quarterly frequency and are available since 2008, when the reporting framework was redesigned. Banks' loan loss provisioning during this period was based on the incurred loss model. 3 Despite a relatively short time span, the data set is interesting, as it comprises the financial crisis period and the subsequent recession. Moreover, the data are unique because they comprise all flow of funds into and out of the allowance on the quarterly frequency, specifically for bad loan losses.
As the supervisory data are raw, they must undergo several consistency checks. These checks revealed several errors and omissions, which have been corrected manually if the causes were tractable.
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Observations that could not be corrected have been deleted from the data set. This left us with a data set of 25 banks with sufficiently long and reliable time series. 5 These 25 banks are mostly larger, universal banks, together comprising 89% of total loans of the Dutch banking industry.
All data used for the present study specifically concern "loans and receivables", which we will from now on simply denote as "loans". Hence, impairments not related to loans do not obscure the data. Impaired [insert Figure 1] 3 Except for two banks, all banks report under the IFRS standards for the entire period. The two remaining banks report (partly) under NL GAAP. The applicable measurement and impairment methodology for loans and receivables is similar under both accounting standards; see, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers (2013, Section 5.2). The results hardly change if the two banks reporting (partly) under NL GAAP are excluded. 4 Errors were due to, among others things, the incorrect accumulation of quarterly amounts within a year and erroneous beginning-and end-of-year figures. 5 Appendix A gives data definitions and sources.
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The changes of the allowances can have different causes (Figure 2 ). We have detailed data on flow of funds into and out of the allowance for 22 of the 25 banks in our sample. Additions to the allowance occur when banks set aside amounts for estimated probable loans losses. Write-offs are done when banks take amounts against allowances to cover actual loan losses; these are negative figures, as the allowance decreases by such write-offs. The allowance also decreases as a result of reversals, when the allowance is reversed because the loss for which the allowance was meant does not materialise. Finally, there can be other adjustments, such as transfers between allowances, exchange rate movements, mergers and acquisitions, the selling of subsidiaries, or the selling of a portfolio. This level of detail with respect to flow of funds into and out of the allowance is, to the best of our knowledge, quite unique in the literature. [insert Figure 3 and Table 1 ]
Model and estimation
Our research questions are the following: (1 
Banks may differ in their provisioning behaviour and their targets for the allowance, because of, for example, differences in their risk profiles. In other words, there is no strong reason to assume that the coefficients in model (1) are the same for each and every bank. In dynamic panel specifications, such differences in the coefficients across banks may induce bias and inconsistent estimates of the average effects across banks, when estimating model (1) in a pooled regression. To avoid this issue, we estimate the model with the mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995) . 8 We refer to the robustness checks for a comparison with pooled estimation results.
If the levels of allowances and impaired loans are stationary, model (1) can be interpreted as a reparameterisation of an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model (Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991)). If, on the other hand, the levels of allowances and impaired loans have unit roots, model (1) is valid only if the levels of allowances and impaired loans cointegrate. Panel unit root tests provide a somewhat mixed view on the time series properties of the allowances and impaired loans, depending on the panel unit root test and 7 An alternative model incorporating an adjustment to a target level is a partial adjustment model. Dahl (2013) uses such a model to assess whether loan loss provisioning by banks differs by external audit practice. In our context, the partial adjustment model would read ΔAllowancei,t = λi (Allowance*i,t -Allowancei,t-1), where Allowance*i,t = δi Impairedi,t + νi,t. This is equivalent to the constraint βi = λi δi in Eq. (1). Hence, this model requires the direct adjustment in response to changes in the level of impaired loans to be the same as the adjustment in response to deviations from the target level. Because of this prior, this model cannot empirically assess whether banks' short-term provisioning behaviour is out of sync with their target levels.
8 the mechanism for lag selection (Table 2) . 9 Nevertheless, the error correction model panel cointegration test of Westerlund (2007) rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% significance level according to the Gα and Gτ statistic, and at the 10% and 5% significance levels (obtained by means of bootstrapping)
according to the Pα and Pτ statistic, respectively (Table 2) . Hence, the model is valid regardless of the presence of a unit root in both variables.
[insert Table 2 ]
Average results
The baseline estimation results are presented in Table 3 , column (1). 10 The interpretation of the results is as follows. Banks aim, on average, for an allowance of 49% of the quantity of impaired loans. The immediate adjustment of the allowance is only 29% of the change of impaired loans. The difference between the immediate adjustment and the target level is made up in time. After one quarter the difference is closed by 34%; after a year the adjustment is 81%.
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[insert Table 3] To shed more light on the potential change in provisioning behaviour during the crisis period, we split the sample in the early crisis period (2008) (2009) ) and the later crisis period (2010-2014Q2). Columns (2) and (3) in Table 3 present the estimation results for the 22 banks for which data availability was sufficient for these sub-periods. The results in the two columns are very similar and close to the estimation results for the entire sample period. Most notable is the difference in the speed of adjustment to the target level in the early and later crisis periods. In the early crisis period, the speed of adjustment per quarter is 50%, while in the later crisis period the speed of adjustment per quarter is estimated at 29%. This difference suggests that, even though the target level remained the same, banks took more time to reach the target level while the crisis persisted. Apparently, the longer the duration of the crisis, the harder it was for the banks to maintain a sufficient level of provisions.
Thus far, the results do not show which components of the flow of funds into and out of the allowances are contributing most to the desired adjustment of the allowance level. As explained in Figure 2 , a change of the allowance can occur because of an addition, write-off, reversal, or another adjustment. 
In this model, Componenti,t may refer to any component of the flow of funds into and out of the allowances, as specified in Figure 2 . The model has two explanatory variables. The coefficient for the first variable, βi, captures a particular component's contribution to the immediate adjustment in response to a change in the level of impaired loans. The coefficient for the second variable, λi, captures a particular component's contribution to the gradual adjustment of the allowance level to its target. Moreover, the definition of the deviation from the target level is the same as in model (1). It is calculated as: (Allowancei,t-1 -di Impairedi,t-1), where di is the estimated bank-specific coefficient δi for the equilibrium relation in model (1).
Since the flow of funds decomposition data is not available for our entire sample but for a subsample of 22 banks, we first verify whether the behaviour of the immediate and gradual adjustments of the allowance is similar for this subsample. Table 4 , column (1) shows the estimate of model (2) based on the subsample if the left-hand side variable is replaced by ΔAllowancei,t. If the immediate and gradual adjustments in the allowance are similar, the estimated coefficients should be the same as those reported in Table 3 , column
(1). 12 The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients for the subsample are similar to those reported in Table   3 . Hence, the behaviour of the immediate and the gradual adjustments of the allowance in response to the accumulation of problem loans is similar for both samples.
[insert Table 4] The extent to which the different flow of funds components contribute to the adjustment of the allowance follows from the results presented in columns (2)- (5) in Table 4 . Coefficient β is significant in the model only for the additions to the allowance, i.e., column (2). This suggests that the additions especially contribute to the immediate adjustment of the allowance in response to changes in the amount of problem loans. By contrast, we do not observe a significant immediate response in any of the other components.
The contributions of the different flow of funds components to the adjustment of the allowance to its target level follow from the estimates for coefficient λ. Coefficient λ is significant in the models for the addition to and the reversal of the allowance. This implies that banks report both higher additions and lower reversals if the actual allowance is below the target level, and vice versa. However, the estimated coefficient for the reversals is smaller than the coefficient for the additions, which suggests that the further additions to the allowance play a major role.
The results obtained so far imply that banks, being confronted by an increase of impaired loans in a particular quarter, do not immediately provision the full target amount for this, but only a part thereof. They compensate for this through larger additions to the allowances in subsequent quarters and also, to some extent, by lower reversals. That write-offs are not used to accommodate desired adjustments of the allowances is to be expected; if loan losses materialise for which provisions have been built, they have to be deducted from the allowance. "Other adjustments" are probably too arbitrary (Figure 3 ), as they do not fulfil a significant role in the adjustment to the target level.
Supervisory implications
The previous section provides empirical evidence for the claim that banks do not adjust the level of allowances immediately to their target level when changes in the amount of problem loans occur. To understand the motivation of banks and the implications from a supervisory perspective, it is important to understand the theoretical consequences of the documented provisioning behaviour on the level of the allowance for bad loan losses. In particular, it is important to notice that the gradual adjustment of the allowance to a target level does not result in a structurally lower or higher level of reported allowances.
Instead, the empirical behaviour of banks results in a decline of the reported peaks in the level of the allowance.
Formally, this can be shown as follows. Let {ii,t-s; … ; ii,t+s} denote the series with the historical and current non-negative amount of impaired loans as a fraction of the total loan portfolio. Moreover, let {ai,t-s; … ;
ai,t+s} denote the series with the allowance that bank i reports for expected losses on problem loans. Let the unconditional (structural) mean of both series be finite. 13 If banks were to fully (F) adjust the level of the reported allowance directly to their target levels, then, for any t, banks report the level of the allowance in accordance with the following rule:
11 Instead, based on estimates of the model in Eq.
(1), we find that the empirical (E) behaviour of banks is better described by the following gradual adjustment rule:
It is not difficult to see that the rule based on gradual adjustment to a target level in Eq. (4) does not result in a structurally lower or structurally higher level of the allowance than the full adjustment rule in Eq. (3).
The average level of the allowance under both rules can be obtained by deriving the unconditional expectation of a (4) that both rules have the same unconditional expectation for the level of the allowances. This unconditional average equals E(a
, where E(.) denotes the expectations operator. In other words, regardless of the rule followed by banks, in the long run, the full adjustment and gradual adjustment will both result in approximately the same average level of the allowance.
Nevertheless, the level of the peaks in the allowances will be different for the two behavioural rules. To see this, consider the top of the highest peaks in the allowance according to both behavioural rules. These maximum levels can be obtained by taking the maximum of a 
To see whether this is lower than the highest peak in the level of the allowances is in case of the gradual adjustment toward a target rule in Eq. (4), it is useful to rewrite the level of the allowance under the gradual adjustment rule as
where the first equality follows from Eq. (3), and where the second equality follows from iteration. The expression within brackets in (7) is an exponentially weighted average of {a 
Both inequalities follow from the fact that max{γ x + (1 -γ) y} ≤ γ max{x} + (1 -γ) max{y} for 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
The condition on γ implies that the first inequality holds for the parameter value 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1, while the second inequality holds for 0 ≤ βi / δi ≤ 1.
The two conditions warranting lower peaks in the reported level of allowances under the gradual adjustment behaviour also have economical interpretations. The condition βi / δi ≤ 1 requires the immediate adjustment in response to the changes in the amount of problem loans to be less than the amount required to directly adjust to the target level. The results in Table 3 , column 1, suggests that the immediate adjustment in the allowance is on average 29% of the change in the problem loans, while the target level is on average 49% of the level of the problem loans. The ratio between the two is 0.59, which implies that this condition is satisfied. The condition λi ≤ 1 requires that deviations from banks' target levels do not result in subsequent overreactions, such that the level of allowances will overshoot their target. Empirically, this condition is satisfied, following the results in Table 3 , column 1, since the empirical adjustment is on average 34% of the deviation from the target level.
Before discussing the supervisory implications, it may be worthwhile to note that the derivation above does not rely on strong assumptions regarding the statistical properties of the fraction of impaired loans. This is important, because the amount of problem loans may exhibit strongly non-normal behaviour and serial dependence. The derivation above shows that, regardless of this statistical behaviour, the gradual adjustment of the level of allowances by banks will result in lower peaks, while it will not affect the structural average level of the allowances.
The consequences of these theoretical implications are illustrated in Figure 4 . Given a hypothetical development of impaired loans, the figure shows the allowance level for the two behavioural provisioning rules described above. The parameter choices for allowances simulated with the gradual adjustment rule based on error correction in Eq. (4) are in line with the empirical results reported in Table 3 , column 1, i.e., βi = 0.29, λi = 0.34 and δi = 0.49. The level of the allowance based on the full adjustment rule in Eq. (3) is in line with the empirical average target level reported in Table 3 , i.e., δi = 0.49. The figure illustrates the following consequences of the error correction behaviour:
1. With error correction, the peaks in the allowance are less high than with full adjustment;
2. Error correction results in a prolongation of the period of increased allowance levels after the peaks; as a consequence, the mean levels for the allowance are equal under both behavioural rules;
3. When problems at a bank result in a strong increase of the level of impaired loans, error correction will result in a delayed and smaller increase of the allowance.
[insert Figure 4 ]
For bank supervisors, the third observation may be especially worrisome. When there is an increase of impaired loans, gradual adjustment results in a smaller response in the level of the allowance. This is especially worrisome when impaired loans increase sharply, as was the case in the crisis period of 2008 (and illustrated at the end of the period in Figure 4 ). In such situations, obtaining timely information on banks' bad loan losses is essential to bank supervisors, since slowing banks' reporting of loan loss provisioning by several quarters can delay regulatory interventions.
Monitoring individual banks
The "average" gradual adjustment behaviour of our sample of banks masks potential differences in the provisioning behaviour of individual banks. For bank supervisors it is relevant to know which banks are slower when adjusting their allowances for loan losses to their target levels. Even though the reported average level of the allowances of those banks may seem to be appropriate, such banks will report a lowerthan-justified level of allowances when severe problems in their loan portfolios emerge. In this section, we show how the estimation results from the panel error correction model may be processed into two metrics that summarize the provisioning behaviour of the individual banks.
Our first metric provides insight into the extent to which the immediate adjustment of the allowance following a change of the level of impaired loans meets the bank's target level. This metric is presented in Figure 5 . It shows the estimated immediate adjustment of the allowance for a change in impaired loans on the horizontal axis against the target level of the allowance on the vertical axis, expressed as a percentage of the change and the level of impaired loans, respectively. Each (blue) diamond denotes a single bank.
Each bank's position on the horizontal axis is given by the bank-specific estimate of βi; its position on the vertical axis is given by the bank-specific estimate of δi. The red dot ("All") is based on the average across the whole sample; its location is defined by the mean group estimate presented in the previous section.
[insert Figure 5]
The diagonal line in Figure 5 presents the position of banks for which the immediate adjustment in the level of allowance is precisely sufficient to raise the level of the allowance for impaired loans to their target level.
Most banks are positioned above the diagonal line. This indicates that banks in our sample, as a rule, do not immediately adjust the level of their allowances toward the target level that would correspond with the new level of impaired loans.
Our second metric gives an impression of the speed of the adjustment of the allowance. Speed is determined by two factors: the immediate adjustment of the allowance to a change in impaired loans, and the speed by which the deviation of the allowance from the target level is diminished. Figure 6 provisioning behaviour is relatively out of sync with their target levels. At the same time, the half-life of the discrepancy between the target and the immediate adjustment is also relatively long for these banks. Both metrics may prompt a supervisor to pay special attention to such banks.
Robustness checks
An issue with error correction models is whether or not to include additional lags, constants or trends. In the context of our model, the significance of an additional lag would suggest a delayed response of the level of the allowance to changes in the level of impaired loans that is not captured by the documented correction to the target level. We include an additional lag in Table 5 , model (1). The results suggest that the delayed response outside the documented correction to the target level is insignificant, both statistically and economically (1.3% of the lagged change in impaired loans). Moreover, including an additional lag hardly affects the magnitude of the estimated coefficients for the average target level, δi, and the average speed of adjustment to the target, λi.
[insert Table 5] Our estimation period coincides with a strong increase in provisioning for bad loans. A potential concern is that our estimation results are distorted because of this trend in the data. To test whether this is the case, we include a constant and a trend in Table 5 , model (2). Both the constant and the trend are statistically insignificant. In contrast to the positive trend in the data, we observe a small negative sign for the estimated trend in the model. These results support modelling the level of the allowance based on the target level, which depends on the level of impaired loans during our estimation period.
[insert Table 6] Results based on alternative estimation methodologies are reported in Table 6 . Model (1) shows the estimation results based on the common correlated effects estimator of Pesaran (2006) . This can be considered as a more robust estimator than the mean group estimator, as it allows for cross-sectional correlation as a consequence of unobserved common factors. The other models in Table 6 do not allow for full heterogeneity in the estimated coefficients across banks. Table 6 , model (2) is estimated using the pooled mean group estimator of Pesaran et al. (1999) , and assumes the same target level for the allowances across banks, i.e., δi = δ. Table 6 , model (3) is estimated using the pooled within estimator, which also assumes the same short-run effect and adjustment to the target across banks. Notably, the latter two models estimate a slower adjustment to the target level (i.e., a lower λi), which is in line with the theoretical prediction that pooled regressions will induce this coefficient to be downward biased in the presence of heterogeneity across banks; see Pesaran and Smith (1995, pp. 85-86) . Hence, in our context, allowing for heterogeneity across banks avoids underestimation of the average speed at which banks bring the allowances toward their target levels.
Summary and conclusion
In this paper we study the timing of banks' loan loss provisioning during the crisis. First, we have estimated a panel error correction model using supervisory micro data on the allowance for loan losses of 25 Dutch banks over the period 2008Q2-2014Q2. Our results show that our sample of Dutch banks aim for an allowance of, on average, 49% of impaired loans. In the short run, however, the adjustment of the allowance is only 29% of the change of impaired loans. The resulting deviation of the level of the allowance from the target level is closed in subsequent quarters. After one quarter, the adjustment to the target level is 34%;
after four quarters it is around 81%. Theoretically, this behaviour results in a delayed and smaller increase of the level of the allowances when banks face a strong increase of the level of impaired loans.
Second, we have examined which flow of funds into and out of the allowance for loan losses contribute most to the gradual adjustment of the level of the allowance to the target level. For this, we used data that are unique in that they comprise detailed flow of funds into and out of the allowances for loans losses. The results of this analysis suggest that the gradual adjustment of the allowance to the target level is achieved mostly by (a) larger additions to the allowance and (b) lower reversals of the allowance when losses do not materialise.
Third, we used the model outcomes to reveal differences in provisioning behaviour among the individual banks in our sample. We presented two metrics that reveal the extent to which banks' short-term provisioning behaviour is out of sync with their target levels. As slowing increases in the allowance for loan losses may result in serious delays in regulatory interventions at banks, these model-based metrics may be useful for supervisors as a tool to assess the provisioning behaviour of individual banks. Note: Estimated with the mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995) . Standard errors within parentheses. The estimated model is ΔAllowancei,t = βi ΔImpairedi,t -λi (Allowancei,t-1 -δi Impairedi,t-1) + ɛi,t. Significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1% levels are denoted by *, **, ***, respectively. Note: Estimated with the mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995) . Standard errors within parentheses. The estimated model is Componenti,t = βi ΔImpairedi,t -λi (Deviation from the target leveli,t) + ξi,t. The "deviation from the target leveli,t" is calculated as: (Allowancei,t-1 -di Impairedi,t-1), where di is the bank-specific coefficient for the long-run relationship according to the estimated Eq. (1). Significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1% levels are denoted by *, **, ***, respectively. Note: The figure is based on the estimated coefficients of the model: ΔAllowancei,t = βi ΔImpairedi,t -λi (Allowancei,t-1 -δi Impairedi,t-1) + ɛi,t. The horizontal coordinate is determined by βi; the vertical coordinate by δi. For individual banks (blue diamonds), bank-specific estimates of the coefficients are used. Three banks with an estimated coefficient δi ≥ 1 are shown in the figure with a target level of 100%. The location of the whole sample (red dot) is based on the mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995 Figure 6 . Half-life of deviation from target, and difference between target level and immediate adjustment of the allowance for loan losses Note: The figure is based on the estimated coefficients of the model: ΔAllowancei,t = βi ΔImpairedi,t -λi (Allowancei,t-1 -δi Impairedi,t-1) + ɛi,t. The horizontal coordinate is calculated as log(½)/log(1 -λi); the vertical coordinate as (δi -βi)/δi. For individual banks (blue diamonds), bank-specific estimates of the coefficients are used. The location of the whole sample (red dot) is based on the mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995 Half-life of deviation from target level (in quarters) All
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